Scenarios for the future of Venezuela by Evan Ellis, Robert
www.ssoar.info
Scenarios for the future of Venezuela
Evan Ellis, Robert
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Evan Ellis, R. (2018). Scenarios for the future of Venezuela. IndraStra Global, 4(1), 1-10. https://nbn-resolving.org/
urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-55586-7
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-SA Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Weitergebe unter gleichen
Bedingungen) zur Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den
CC-Lizenzen finden Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-SA Licence
(Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0
IndraStra Global Vol. 04, Issue No: 01 (2018) 


















Date of Publication: Jan 10, 2018                                              
 
Scenarios for the Future of Venezuela 
By Dr. R. Evan Ellis 
Research Professor, Latin American Studies, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College 
 
The Venezuelan government’s arrest of former oil minister Eulogio del Pino and former head 
of PdVSA Nelson Martinez at the end of November 2017, and its sacking of former PdVSA head 
Rafael Ramirez as Venezuela’s ambassador to the United Nations suggests that the crisis in 
Venezuela may be entering a dangerous new stage in which the Chavistas, although seeming to 
strengthen their hand, are beginning to “eat their own,” unwittingly changing calculations of 
leaders and military elites upon whose continuing tolerance the Maduro Government’s survival 
depends. 
   
Events in Venezuela in recent weeks suggest that the Maduro regime has improved its position, 
winning a series of symbolically important contests as divisions in the opposition grow deeper.  
The ruling party’s unexpected victory in 18 of Venezuela’s 23 states in overdue regional 
elections, broadly denounced as fraudulent, and its winning of 308 of 335 seats in December 
municipal elections after key opposition parties boycotted the election, further demoralized 
and split opposition ranks. 
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Even before the setbacks of November-December 2017, the opposition had been frustrated 
over its inability to secure political change through massive and sustained street 
protests pressure from the international community via the 12-nation Lima Group.  Nor was 
the opposition or international community able to block the election and August 2017 
seating of an unconstitutional constituent assembly, which appears poised to rewrite the 
constitution to provide a legal veneer to the authoritarian state gradually created by 
Nicholas Maduro and his predecessor Hugo Chavez.  
 
The boycott of the December municipal elections by parts of the opposition has also given 
Maduro the excuse to exclude from 2018 presidential elections those parties who boycotted 
municipal elections, eliminating two of Maduro’s chief rivals for the Presidency, Leopoldo 
Lopez (under house arrest) and Henrique Capriles.  Such machinations, if validated by the new 
Constituent Assembly, leave Maduro as the frontrunner for the 2018 Presidential election, if 
held.  Indeed, even if Maduro lost to an opposition presidential candidate, in theory, the 
constituent assembly has the self-delegated power to remove the victor. 
 
Despite such appearances, the financial collapse of Venezuela, almost completely dependent 
on oil revenues to sustain the government’s activities, including the military, and buy off its 
supporters, continues apace.  As of the end of November 2017, both the country and PdVSA 
were in technical default on hundreds of millions of dollars of bonds and associated interest 
payments, creating the possibility that international creditors could begin to execute default 
provisions in that could lead to the seizure of PdVSA assets globally, precipitating a revenue and 
payments crisis which could finally force the military to move to oust Maduro. 
   
Yet nothing is guaranteed. How Venezuela’s international creditors will treat ambiguous 
default events, what assets they might seek to attach in international tribunals, and whether 
PdVSA has insulated itself from such actions by how it has structured its contracts, and by 
moving its current accounts to China’s CITIC Bank, are all unclear.  Similarly, while the majority 
of people in Maduro’s own government, as well as his Chinese, Russian, and Cuban backers 
arguably would prefer someone more competent at the helm, it is difficult to judge at what 
point they will judge that it is less risky to replace him, than to continue to tolerate his 
economic mismanagement and impulsive statements and actions. 
 
Events in Venezuela are also playing out in the context of substantial changes within the 
country, in the region, and in the international arena more broadly.  Domestically, 
the collectivos, like Central American street gangs, have become de facto governments in their 
own right, controlling territory, and often engaging in illicit activities.  The presence of a range 
of criminal actors with interests in the country from non-demobilized elements 
of Colombia’s Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios de Colombia (FARC), to homegrown criminal 
organizations such as the Tren de Aragua, adds to the unpredictability.  It is arguably difficult 
for both the government and opposition actors to anticipate whether such groups will choose 
to “keep their heads down,” or fight, in the context of various ways in which order could break 
down in the country. 
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In the region, the political identity of key friends and opponents of the Maduro regime may 
change in the coming months, and with it, their posture toward the government. Among 
Venezuela’s friends, Cuba’s leader Raul Castro will step down in February 2018, while Ecuador’s 
new president Lenin Moreno, has already demonstrated a more thoughtful, less 
unconditionally supportive posturetoward Venezuela than his predecessor.   A final 
determination of victory by Salvador Nasralla in Honduras, a further turn to the left by 
Salvadoran President Salvador Sanchez Ceren, or the election of Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador 
in Mexico, would all potentially create breathing room for the Maduro regime. 
 
Beyond the Western Hemisphere, a military action in North Korea could shape China’s 
willingness to underwrite the Venezuelan government, while a major change in oil prices, upon 
which Russiadepends to fund its government as well as it oil investments, could impact the 
options of state oil company Rosneft to continue providing financial support for the regime. 
 
While, as the preceding arguments suggest, the future of Venezuela depends on a myriad of 
factors, the nation’s future will be less shaped by the ability of the opposition to negotiate with 
the regime, but rather, by the unfolding of the current debt default, the associated decision of 
the military if or when to force a regime change, and the posture of the nation’s two principal 
financial backers, China and Russia, as the crisis unfolds. 
   
Although there is a myriad of ways in which the situation in Venezuela could play out in the 
coming months, it is useful to organize such possibilities into a limited number of scenarios that 
can be used by the U.S. and regional policymakers for planning.  This work suggests four: 
 
Scenario 1:  Muddling Through / Chinese-Russian Vassal State 
 
In this scenario, Maduro stays in power, with either a fraudulent victory in the presidential 
election held in 2018 or its suspension. Due in part to the continuation of Maduro, his policies, 
and the kleptocratic leadership with which he is associated, Venezuela’s poor economic 
performance and international isolation also continues. Previously mentioned elections in Latin 
America and the Caribbean could modestly expand the pool of neighbors expressing sympathy 
for the regime, but Venezuela’s exclusion from international credit markets would continue. 
Although the Maduro regime might be buoyed somewhat by rising international oil prices, it 
would become increasingly dependent on direct oil sales to Russia (with its petroleum likely 
refined in Essar’s Vadinar Refinery, acquired by Rosneft through its $12.9 billion purchase of 
Essar), and the PRC (with the petroleum refined in the new Guangdong refinery, once it came 
online).  The regime would likely eventually default on much of its sovereign debt held by 
Western creditors, as well as PdVSA’s bonds, which generally do not enjoy sovereign immunity. 
The defaults would add to the growing number of judgments against Venezuela in international 
courts, extending even further the regime’s dependence on Russia and China, owing to the 
legal risks of exposing Venezuela’s assets to Western courts through commercial transactions.  
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Indeed, the regime’s billion-dollar settlement with the mining firm Crystallex, after the latter 
sought to attach the overseas assets of PDV Holdings to a previous judgment, shows how 
vulnerable PdVSA is to such international actions. 
 
Through alteration of the Venezuelan constitution by the Constituent Assembly, Russia and 
China would be able to expand their claims on Venezuelan oilfields and other assets assets, and 
possibly even assume a degree of day-to-day management over the Venezuelan economy, 
effectively running certain parts of the country to include a de facto veto over certain policies, 
while paying Maduro and the other Venezuelan elites rents to tolerate the situation.  The 
leverage that both already have over the desperate, cash-strapped Maduro regime was 
illustrated by the rapidity with which PdVSAsettled a $23 million debt with Sinopec when the 
later reluctantly took it to court in the US over the matter.  Similarly, in mid-December, PdVSA 
gave the Russian oil firm Rosneft, which it owes $6 billion, lucrative contracts for offshore gas 
fields, Patao and Mejillones, including the right to sell all gas extracted there on international 
markets. 
 
While the rationality of Venezuelan economic management might improve somewhat with the 
oversight of the Russians and Chinese, Maduro would likely be free to continue to promote a 
radical leftist agenda, including political (but only modest economic) support for the São Paolo 
Forum, and various leftist politicians and criminal groups across the region. 
   
In this scenario, Venezuela could provide base access to the Russians, and could host an 
expanded relationship with the Iranian regime of Hussain Rouhani, empowered by his 
reelection, the ending of sanctions, the freeing up of $150 billion in frozen financial 
assets previously embargoed by the U.S., and possibly provoked by the scrapping of the Iran 
nuclear agreement by the Trump administration, with an interest in working on Venezuelan 
territory to continue its proliferation activities. 
 
While Venezuela could behave in a more radical fashion toward its neighbors under this 
scenario, and possibly could serve as a conduit of Russian, Chinese, Iranian and Cuban influence 
in the region, it would arguably lose some of its credibility as a thought leader, due to the 
negative perception of the regime among those with a more ideologically-based leftist posture. 
   
From the perspective of the region, the “muddling through” scenario would continue to 
generate refugees, flowing into Colombia, Brazil and the Caribbean as those who opposed the 
regime, or could not survive economically, chose to leave. The level of refugees would, 
however, be less and more gradual than if the state collapsed (discussed as part of scenario 
four, in this paper). 
 
Scenario 2: Transition to more rational authoritarian kleptocracy 
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In this scenario, Maduro would be forced out by other members of the government and 
military elite, likely in coordination with the Cubans, and possibly involving consultations with 
the Chinese and Russians. They would arguably do so, in order to create the basis for a more 
economically and politically rational regime that could re-engage with foreign investors, and 
would thus be less likely to financially and politically implode.  In short, they would act to 
reduce the risk of a less controlled political transition, in which the significant numbers of 
persons in the current regime involved with illicit enrichment and other crimes might be 
extradited to the United States. 
There are multiple possibilities for a transition, all producing similar results.  On the more 
consensual end of the spectrum, Maduro could declare success and voluntarily retire.  
Alternatively, the newly empowered Constituent Assembly could forcibly retire him. Within the 
framework of the Constituent Assembly, he could be arrested and tried for crimes.At the 
extreme, Maduro could suffer an unfortunate accident and receive a hero’s burial, before his 
crimes were posthumously exposed by the new leadership. The result, in practical terms, would 
be similar (although the appearance of putting Maduro on trial might assist the kleptocratic 
elite in creating the impression that they were conducting “real change,” for the purpose of 
reaching out to the opposition, the global community, and international lenders and investors). 
In all such variants, this scenario does presume that a significant split would not occur within 
the military over the transition. 
Whatever the specifics, the post-Maduro kleptocratic leadership would likely seek to bring 
elements of the opposition into the coalition and give particular attention to using the 
constituent assembly as a constitutional and legislative instrument to create a veneer of 
legality, in order to most successfully attract the return of some foreign investment. 
   
As in the previous scenario, the Venezuelan Constituent Assembly would likely modify the 
constitution to give Russia and China expanded equity stakes in the country’s resources, as well 
as other guarantees to attract the new loans and investments the regime requires to maintain 
its liquidity and recapitalize petroleum production.  Yet by contrast to the greater need and 
more simplistic logic of Maduro in the first scenario, the kleptocrats in scenario two would 
arguably be less inclined to cede day-to-day economic management and other decision 
authority to Russian and Chinese technocrats. Rather, to attract the needed capital, they would 
more likely reach out to select state actors and major petroleum companies, offering them the 
opportunity to be among the first to have access to the nation’s 300 billion barrels of petroleum 
reserves on preferential terms, with the incentive of more rational economic management, 
stronger legal guarantees and expanded protections for their investments under the 
country’s “new management.” It would be a Faustian bargain that some, although not all, of 
the actors, might accept. 
 
While the compromise between the private sector and the interests of the elites might 
resemble the approach of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, the approach to dealing with 
Venezuela’s tremendous accumulated debt might resemble Argentina after its 2001 debt 
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default, seeking to settle some outstanding international cases in order to preserve some 
access to the international financial arena, while legally maneuvering to escape from others. 
 
In its foreign policy, by contrast to the first scenario, the new regime in the second would likely 
exercise restraint from excessively provocative types of engagement such as military basing 
agreements with the Russians, visible ties with criminal and terrorist groups, or close ties to 
Iran, in order to escape from the “pariah” label, and thus isolation by the international financial 
community. The new regime might even offer the U.S. and Europe normalized political ties and 
limited cooperation against organized crime, albeit not agreeing to extradition.  The regime 
would also likely continue to quietly bankroll politically acceptable leftist causes such as the São 
Paolo forum, in order to maintain its own leftist credentials, and would ironically be in a better 
condition than in the first scenario, to fund that support. 
   
The ability of the regime to reintegrate itself with the Latin America and the Caribbean more 
broadly would depend, in part, on the previously mentioned unfolding of key elections in the 
region. There is similarly a range of possibilities regarding the regime’s ability to reach 
settlements with international creditors or attract the participation of conventional 
international investors. 
With respect to refugees, this scenario would be the least burdensome of the four on 
Venezuela’s neighbors, albeit not without persons wishing to leave the country. 
 
Scenario 3: Break and successful reestablishment of order by military 
 
In the third scenario, Venezuela would suffer a breakdown in governance, with a brief period of 
significant violence and contested sovereignty, after which the military would succeed in 
restoring order, creating the opportunity for a modestly more significant political transition 
than in the first two scenarios. 
 
The contemplated breakdown would likely be triggered, in part, by the financial crisis currently 
unfolding in the country, in combination with a precipitating event. In addition, further 
criminalization and removal of leaders from the regime by the Maduro government could forge 
a critical mass in the military who perceive that as the regime began to “eat its own,” inaction 
(rather than action) had become riskier to their personal fortunes and prospects for avoiding 
jail. The assassination of Maduro or another key leader could also act as a trigger event. 
 
For this scenario to occur, the Cuban government would probably have to decide that the time 
had come to discretely not mention the emerging threat to Maduro; their considerable 
penetration of the Venezuelan military and society by their intelligence services would make it 
unlikely that they would not perceive an attempted coup against Maduro as it developed. 
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Similarly, for the present scenario, the Russians, and Chinese would have to refrain from 
impeding successful military resolution of the conflict, such as they could achieve by 
withholding resources from their Venezuelan military and government counterparts as the 
situation develops. 
 
Finally, this scenario assumes that the U.S. would not extensively intervene as the violence 
plays out, and that the mobilization and violent actions by groups across the country such as 
the collectivos, and domestic and international criminal actors, will not get so out of control so 
as to surpass the ability of the government to manage the situation. 
 
As with the first two scenarios, this one contains multiple variants.  If the violence was initiated 
by a faction within the kleptocratic leadership, and if the Russians, Chinese and Cubans tacitly 
supported the military response, the prospect of the military successfully restoring order in the 
near term would arguably be higher, although the probability of meaningful political change 
would be lower.  On the other hand, if the violence were precipitated by junior officers 
rebelling against their corrupted superiors, or refusing to follow unlawful or unethical orders, 
the prospect for disorder spiraling out of control would be greater, but the possibility of 
meaningful change following the restoration of that order would also be higher. 
 
Whatever the path to disorder, the military force restoring order would likely scapegoat and 
conduct trials against a range of leaders for violation of the previous constitutional order, 
cloaking themselves in their traditional role as defenders of the constitution. The transitional 
government that they set up would likely focus on the established presidential elections in 
2018, or schedule new elections (depending on when the event took place) as a path to 
legitimation and acceptance by the international community.  In this process, the military 
would be particularly motivated to reach out to the opposition as part of their legitimation, and 
depending on the level of violence and reaction of the international community, might even be 
willing to accept international observers or peacekeepers. 
 
The number of refugees generated by this scenario would probably be greater than for the two 
previously examined scenarios, but lower, over the long run than scenario four, to be discussed 
next. 
 
Scenario 4: Breakdown of order and disintegration into chaos 
 
The breakdown of order contemplated by scenario four, following a precipitating chain of 
events, parallels the dynamics discussed for the previous one, except that the military would be 
unable to quickly regain control, leading the country to degenerate into a situation mutually 
reinforcing violence and economic collapse. The unfolding violence would likely further provoke 
the participation of local and international criminal groups, the collectivos, and other armed 
actors with stakes in the outcome, to possibly include select external actors such as the 
Cubans.  Such violence could also give rise to incursions across the Colombian border, or even a 
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deliberate invasion of Colombia by the regime as its power crumbled, in a desperate gambit to 
unify the country and avoid the internal crisis.  Such a scenario, if it occurred, would likely 
involve a thrust into the La Guajira region by Venezuelan armor, and possibly operations by 
Venezuelan-operated Russian combat aircraft against targets in Bogota and elsewhere in the 
country, before such an advance was stopped or had to be suspended because of the inability 
to support it logistically. 
 
As suggested in Scenario 3, attempts by the Russians or Chinese to control such a scenario by 
suspending funds to the Venezuelan state, or blocking the use of their military equipment, 
could actually contribute to the escalation of the crisis by impairing an effective response as the 
violence spiraled out of control.  Similarly, junior officers could refuse to follow the orders of 
their superiors, contributing to a dynamic and confusing situation with significant uncertainty 
regarding the loyalties of units across the country. 
 
In such an environment, the Russians and Chinese would likely find themselves both attempting 
to protect their assets in the country, such as the oilfields, while simultaneously attempting to 
evacuate their personnel, to include conducting selective interventions in the conflict to 
support these objectives, or to selectively guide events to their advantage. 
 
At its extreme, the unfolding violence could resemble the conflict in Syria, with pockets of 
violence flaring up in certain parts of the country before being suppressed or burning out, with 
the focus of conflict shifting elsewhere. 
   
In its terminal stages, by contrast to the other scenarios contemplated herein, such a conflict 
could allow for the deployment of United Nations peacekeeping forces into the country, to the 
extent that Russia and China (with their vetoes in the UN) felt that such a force could help to 
protect their interests and personnel in country. 
 
U.S. Policy Response 
 
The prior analysis of scenarios associated with the unfolding Venezuelan crisis suggests a 
number of principles for the U.S. response, some applicable to all of the scenarios, and others 
specific to individual cases. 
In general, the U.S. should coordinate with partners in the region, including, but not limited to 
Colombia, Brazil, and the states of the Caribbean basin, regarding the management of the flows 
of refugees from the country, as well as attempts to use the unconstitutional Constituent 
Assembly to create the veneer of false legality for any transition. 
 
The U.S. should also avoid the temptation of intervention, with the exception of possible U.S. 
involvement in a United Nations-sanctioned multilateral force in the “Breakdown of order” 
scenario. 
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With respect to the “muddling through” scenario, the U.S. should leverage its strategic 
communications to take advantage of the demonstrated failure of populist socialism, including 
the importance of being vigilant against autocratic elites, who not only squander national 
wealth but cede national sovereignty to foreign actors in pursuit of personal power and 
enrichment. 
 
In this scenario, the United States must also coordinate with China and Russia, and be 
particularly vigilant against their efforts to leverage Venezuela as a platform for advancing their 
own activities and objectives in the region. 
In the scenario “transition to a more rational kleptocracy,” the U.S. should coordinate with 
regional partners to insist on the honoring of Venezuela’s previously-incurred financial 
obligations, and full compliance with international legal norms in areas such as extradition 
before taking any steps to legitimize the new regime, or unwittingly confer legal status to the 
actions of its unconstitutional constituent assembly.  It should bring forth select criminal actions 
as test cases, and resist the temptation of dropping sanctions and otherwise facilitating the 
ability of western firms from returning to the Venezuelan oil sector until the new regime has 
demonstrated its unquestioning commitment to cooperate with the international legal system 
and extradite wanted criminals. 
 
In the third scenario, “break and successful reestablishment of order by the military,” the 
United States should be particularly attentive to attempts by Cuba, Russia, and the PRC to 
influence military outcomes, even while coordinating with Venezuela’s neighbors with respect 
to refugees.  In addition, as with the second scenario, the U.S. should coordinate with neighbors 
in the region so that the Venezuelan military regime understands that it will have to extradite 
criminals, comply with past financial obligations, abolish the unconstitutional constituent 
assembly, and restore the power of the elected national assembly, before being eligible for the 
lifting of sanctions and the legal recognition of contracts signed by the government. 
 
The fourth scenario, “Breakdown of order and disintegration into chaos,” places particular 
importance on international coordination regarding refugees, support for neighboring 
Colombia in light of a spillover of the conflict across the border, and the correct composition of 
a United Nations peacekeeping force, in order to restore order in the country. While the United 
States should strongly oppose the participation of Chinese and Russian peacekeepers in such a 
force (since they would be inherently protecting their own petroleum sector and other interests 
and position in the country), a United Nations force in Venezuela force might create an 
opportunity for usefully repurposing other peacekeeping contingents in the region previously 
dedicate to the MINUSTAH force in Haiti, while leveraging partners such as Colombia and 
Mexico, with an expressed interest in supporting the export of security and deploying 
internationally to crisis zones. 
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It is a testament to the deterioration of the situation in Venezuela that none of the most 
plausible scenarios are“good news” stories, although some are less undesirable than others.  It 
is incumbent on the United States and its partners in Latin America and the Caribbean not only 
to work together to plan for what could transpire in Venezuela but also to collaborate that 
other unfolding tragedies do not degenerate to the same extent. 
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